stock here, Gemini summary
The video summary focuses on three main topics: the Gaza ceasefire, the French political crisis, and the conflict in Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on the military situation in the Donbass region.
Introduction and Gaza Ceasefire
The video begins on Monday, October 13, 2025. The first substantial topic is the implementation of phase one of the ceasefire in Gaza.
- Hostage Release: All 20 remaining live hostages, held by Hamas, have reportedly been released and returned to their families.
- Casualties: An additional 28 hostages, whom Israel believed were still under Hamas’s control, are reported to have died over the past two years of captivity and fighting. The speaker notes the tragedy of the significant number of hostages who have died, while also acknowledging the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza.
- Peace Efforts: There is no word on progress for phase two of the complex peace plan. President Trump is reported to be in the Middle East, having attended the Israeli Parliament and heading to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, where Arab and Western leaders are gathering to consolidate the truce and discuss rebuilding the devastated community.
- Criticism of Diplomacy: The speaker expresses worry that the talks in Sharm el-Sheikh might be unproductive, citing “Eve Smith’s rule” that the West negotiates with itself, as key players like Hamas and its regional backers are not participating.
French Political Crisis
The speaker criticizes French President Macron for attending the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting, arguing he should be in France due to the escalating political crisis, of which he is the “proximate creator.”
- Government Turmoil: Last week, Macron’s latest prime minister-designate, Sebastian Lecornu, resigned after failing to form a cabinet or secure budget agreements.
- Lecornu’s Reappointment: Macron refused to resign or call new parliamentary elections. Instead, he asked Lecornu to try again, and on Friday, Macron renominated Lecornu, who announced a new cabinet that is “essentially the same” as the old one.
- Vote of No Confidence: The National Rally (Marine Le Pen’s party) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s left-wing group have both indicated they will not support the government and are proposing a vote of no confidence, which the government is likely to lose. The Socialist Party and the center-right party, Les Républicains, are also unlikely to vote for the new government.
- Economic Warning: The situation is expected to “protract and prolong,” worsening the economic crisis in Europe. The speaker notes a sharp fall in German beer consumption and brewery closures as a sign that Germany is “unequivocally in recession,” indicating a serious moment in the country’s economic and political history.
- Macron’s Actions: The speaker believes Macron is abdicating his responsibilities by going to Sharm el-Sheikh, as his duty is to remain in Paris to consult with political parties and address France’s domestic issues, which the speaker suggests bore the President.
Conflict in Ukraine, with Focus on Donbass
The second half of the video focuses on the “increasingly catastrophic” military situation for Ukraine in the east, particularly in the Donbass, Kharkov, and Zaporizhzhia regions.
Critical Situation in Donbass
The speaker states that the situation has reached a “decisive point,” with a potential “crisis even a catastrophe” for the Ukrainian army.
- Encirclement: The Ukrainian army is seen as being on the brink of encirclement, or already encircled, in Kupyansk, which is now a confirmed “cauldron.”
- Fighting in Cities: Reports indicate fighting is now taking place within the city limits of Siversk, and possibly inside the village of Dronivka, which is near the main supply road from Sloviansk. There are also claims that fighting is occurring inside Kostiantynivka.
- Rasputitsa: Despite the early onset of the Rasputitsa (autumn mud) limiting maneuverability, the Russian army is not slowing its offensive, potentially because they are using more tracked vehicles and have drones dominating the battlefield, and the fighting has moved into the built-up urban areas where mud is less of an issue.
Analysis of Russian Military Strategy
The speaker discusses the perspective of Russian war reporter Marat Khurulin, who outlined the Russian strategy in Donbass.
- Donbass as the Final Phase: Khurulin views the heavily industrialized, urban-sprawl area of Donbass (with its “developed transport network, densely built up with cities and settlements around numerous industrial enterprises and mines”) as being left for the “final phase” of the Special Military Operation (SMO). This phase will come when the Ukrainian economy is destroyed and the army is weakened and demoralized.
- Clauswitzian Objective: Khurulin confirms the Russian objective is not primarily territorial gain but the “demilitarization of Ukraine, the destruction of the Ukrainian army.”
- Grinding Down the Enemy: The strategy is to advance incrementally, “creat[ing] conditions so that the weakened enemy brings their raw material… to our machine for processing at their own expense.” This means allowing the Ukrainians to reinforce the front lines in eastern Ukraine so that the Russian forces can destroy them in a place of their choosing, rather than chasing them across territory and straining their own logistics.
- Dnipro Bridges: This strategy explains why the Russians have not destroyed the Dnipro River bridges earlier. The speaker believes that destroying the bridges now would only keep Ukrainian forces on the west bank, beyond Russian reach. However, Khurulin is hinting that the moment for moving beyond this logic is approaching, as the “last large node” of Ukrainian forces in Donbass is on the brink of being broken.
- Targeting the Bridges: The speaker reiterates that the first major drone attack on a Dnipro bridge in Kremenchuk a few weeks ago might be a signal. Once Ukrainian defenses in Donbass break, destroying the bridges would make sense to isolate and trap Ukrainian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro, which the Russians mostly control.
Introduction and date announcement
0:00Good day. Today is Monday, 13th October, 2025.
0:05And before I proceed with the remainder of my video, let me remind you again to tick the like
0:12button, if you like this video after you’ve watched it, or if you’ve liked
0:18whatever part of the video you choose to listen to and watch.
0:25Well, with that, let me now get to the substance of the video and let me discuss briefly
0:31to um well, I won’t say that there are less important matters, but matters
0:38about which I have perhaps less to say. Today, the Today marks the first stage
First stage of ceasefire implementation in Gaza
0:46in implementation of phase one of the ceasefire in Gaza.
0:53And there are reports today that all of the remaining hostages who are still
0:58alive, 20 in total, have now been released by Hamas and have returned to
1:06their families. It seems that another 28 hostages who um Israel believed were
1:14still under the control of Habas have died over the course of the last two
1:21years of captivity and fighting. Well, this is a dreadful tragedy. It seems to
1:29me from what I can remember that only um a minority of the hostages who were
1:36still alive at the time of the earlier ceasefire um last year at the start of this year
1:43um have survived and have now been released. Of course, I might be wrong
1:49about this, but anyway, it does seem as if a significant number of the hostages
Release of hostages by Hamas and their return
1:57have died or been killed over the course of this terrible two years of conflict.
2:04And I don’t want to talk just about the hostages because of course tens of
2:09thousands of others, Palestinians in Gaza, of course, have also died.
2:16Nonetheless, I am going to repeat that the release of the hostages and
2:22presumably of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel is in and of itself a good
2:30thing and should be welcomed. Now, there is no word so far of any
2:37progress in negotiating the terms of phase two of this very complex plan to
2:44bring peace to Gaza. President Trump himself, I understand, is now in the
2:50Middle East. I’ve seen reports that he has in fact attended the Israeli Parliament where he was apparently
2:57rapturously received. Anyway, that is a report I briefly saw. I haven’t read it
3:02through properly. and he appears to be heading to Charal Shik in Egypt where
3:08other Arab and Western leaders are gathering all with a view to trying to
3:14find ways to consolidate the truce that has been negotiated in Gaza and perhaps
3:22to rebuild the uh community and um the
3:28buildings and the town there which are of course utterly devastated after two
3:33years of war. In my opinion, whatever discussions take
President Trump’s involvement in Middle East peace negotiations
3:39place in Charal Shake, they might conceivably be helpful, but the really
3:45difficult negotiations are going to be taking place in the next few weeks and
3:52months. And so far as I can see, the people who perhaps ultimately matter in
4:01moving this process of negotiation forward, Hamas and its various regional
4:07backers, they are not going to be participating in this meeting at Charal Shake. And one does worry that just
4:15possibly we could be seeing another iteration of um Eve Smith’s rule that
4:23the West spends all its time negotiating with itself and coming up with elaborate
4:29agreements which are completely detached from realities and are of no interest to
4:36the other side. Well, I hope in this case it won’t be like that. Now one
4:42particular western leader who is going to be in charl shake is president mron
4:48of France and I think that is wrong. Mron has shown a intense and close
4:55interest in affair events in the Middle East. Ever since he became president, he
5:01has taken the initiative recently in trying to get recognition, international
5:08recognition of the Palestinian state. He has been well a kind of critic of the
5:17war in Gaza. So he does have an interest and he has
5:23played a role. But nonetheless, it seems
5:28to me that at this particular point in time, he should be in France. He should
5:35be in Paris because all of the indications are that the French political crisis of which he is the
Discussion on French political crisis and Macron’s decisions
5:44proximate creator is about to take a further potentially disastrous turn.
5:52Now, as I think I mentioned in my program yesterday, um last week we had
5:58the resignation of his latest prime minister designate, his old friend and
6:04associate Sebastian Lurnu. Lurnu was unable to put together a cabinet or come
6:12to agreements with the parties in the French National Assembly in order to
6:17present a budget. So he resigned and there was a lot of talk
6:25that Mron had reached the end of the road and would call parliamentary elections and there was also talk that
6:33he might have to resign and in fact there were suggestions that he should
6:38resign made by political figures like Macron’s own former prime minister
6:47Edward Phipe. who undoubtedly harbors ambitious ambitions to become French president
6:54himself. Anyway, Macron did none of these things. He didn’t resign himself. I never thought he would and he put off
7:03again the decision to call French parl new parliamentary elections.
7:09Instead, he instructed Lornu to devote another 48 hours to finding means to
7:18establish a government that would have support in the French National Assembly.
7:24Lu said that he would do this. He would act on Macron’s instructions, though he
7:30had no intention of becoming prime minister of France himself.
7:37Well, we finally got to Friday. Luru told Mron that he’d made some progress.
7:44It’s very unclear what that process progress actually was. Just saying. And
7:52we were all waiting to see who the new prime minister of France, who would be
7:58announced on Friday, would be. And there were lots of speculations that it would
8:03be this time somebody from the center left. I understand Mr. Kazunv, who I
8:09understand has been prime minister before, was the most widely expected
8:15figure to be nominated. And instead what happened was that
8:22Mackron renominated Sebastian Lonu who over the last few
8:29hours has announced a cabinet a new cabinet which surprise surprise looks to
8:34be essentially the same cabinet as the old cabinet. All of the ministers and
8:40the key economic ministers, the finance ministry, the budget office and those
8:46others, well, they remain in place. So, unsurprisingly,
8:52the national rally, Marin Lupin’s party have indicated that they will not
8:58support this new government and are proposing a vote of no confidence
9:04against it. Jean Luke Melon’s left-wing group is
9:09saying that they won’t support this new government either and apparently intend
9:15to vote against it in the uh in the vote of confidence that is now being tabled.
9:22Mackerel apparently made a big effort to get the socialist party to agree to
9:29support this new government, but the socialists are furious that Luru was
9:37appointed instead of one of themselves and it seems unlikely that they will
9:43vote for this new government either. and the center-right party le
9:51which Macron has tried to build a coalition with apparently it is
9:56infuriated because Macron appeared at one time to be reaching out to the
10:02socialists I’m not going to waste time more time discussing the various
10:08machinations and intrigues that are taking place in France frankly I find
10:15them all tedious and boring. Suffice to say that it’s the same government as
10:20before. It’s not a government that the French people are interested in or
10:25appear to want to support and it is likely that it will lose the coming vote
10:33of no confidence in the French National Assembly at which point presumably Lonu
10:42will have to resign as prime minister for a second time but this time once and
10:49for all. Now what happens then? Here’s
10:54of course the unresolved question. Does Macron go on proposing prime ministers
Macron’s government and potential vote of no confidence
11:00even as the economic situation in France deteriorates? I’ve been reading an
11:06article about how uh the situation in France is becoming more unstable and how
11:14the bond markets are becoming restless and are be beginning to give indications. people who work in them are
11:21beginning to give indications that they cannot continue to buy French bonds or
11:26hold on to French bonds. Whilst this whole issue of the
11:32government of France and of the budget continues to be unresolved
11:41or does Macron do that which he has
11:47consistently refused to do which is to call parliamentary elections and
11:55unsurprisingly since the announcement of L call appointment. There’s been a cluster of
12:02further demands that Macron himself step down. Though unsurprisingly,
12:08he again has refused to do so or even to give consideration to that possibility.
12:17Well, we are seeing this thing protract and prolong and to be clear the economic
12:24crisis not just in France but in the whole of Europe is deepening. I read
12:30with interest that in Germany which it seems to me is now unequivocally in
12:37recession. Um consumption of beer has fallen sharply and breweries are
12:45starting to close down. some of the famous breweries in Germany that make
12:51German beer, beer which many people consider to be the best in the world. Um
12:59that that industry is now starting to feel the pressure. Anybody who has any
13:05knowledge or experience of Germany would know that the moment when the Germans start to
13:13give up on their beer and their breweries start to shut down is an
13:19important moment in the country’s economic and perhaps political history.
13:26And perhaps that’s where we are now. But to repeat again, this is all part of the
13:33wider crisis which currently if we’re talking about Europe has its epicenter
13:40in France now one way or the other and however this is resolved and whatever it
13:46is that mackerel it in intends to do it still it seems to me that his duty as
13:53France is president is to remain in Paris to remain in the Elise to support
14:00his new prime minister who is of course his old prime minister in whatever way he possibly can, to consult with the
14:07various political parties in the French National Assembly, to take wider soundings amongst the political nation
14:14in France which is not identical to the French political class and which is by
14:21the way enormous. Those are the things that the president
14:26of the French Republic should be doing. As far as I am concerned, it is an
14:33abdication of Macron’s responsibilities to go to Charal Shake and to spend time
14:42there discussing an issue, the Gaza ceasefire,
14:49where he and France can anyway only be a
14:55marginal player. But unsurprisingly,
15:01that is exactly what Macron has decided to do. Of course, Macron doesn’t want to
15:09spend time talking to France’s political nation. He doesn’t want to talk to the
15:17leaders of the French political parties. He doesn’t want to address the complex
15:23underlying problems of France. Doing all that ultimately bores him. He doesn’t
15:29want to dirty his hands by making compromises which political leaders in
15:35these kind of situations sometimes must do. He’s far happier meeting with these
15:42leaders in far away shalik people that he likes and understands and
15:49amongst whom he feels himself to be amongst friends that he is dealing with
15:54the problems of France and in this mackerel is absolutely
16:03typical. After all, in Britain, people call the prime minister never hear K
16:12because prime minister Karma is so often away. In Germany, they have
16:21c been calling um Chancellor Mertz, Friedri Mertz, the foreign policy
16:28chancellor because he seems to devote so much time to him. So MRO in this in
16:36giving the impression that he’s much more happy and far more com comfortable in this sort of company than he is
16:45amongst the people who he is ultimately responsible to. Well, in that he is no
16:51different. Anyway, this is all I’m going to say about this today. No doubt when
16:56we get a clearer sense of where the crisis in France is going, I will have a lot more to say and no doubt at that
17:03point we will discuss it also on the Juran as well. Now the rest of this
Transition to topics on Ukraine and US-China trade war
17:09program I’m going to devote to two topics. One is the conflict in Ukraine. The second is the trade war between
17:15China and the United States which is now heating up. But I am going to speak
17:21first about the pro program in Ukraine. Yesterday I discussed what it seemed to
Overview of Ukraine’s military situation and potential crisis
17:28me was the increasingly catastrophic military situation that Ukraine is
17:33facing. I said that it seemed to me that the situation has reached a decisive
17:41point that we are looking at a potential
17:48crisis even a catastrophe for the Ukrainian army
17:55in eastern Ukraine in Dombbass and Kharkov and Zaporosia region regions in
18:04Ukraine. Ukraine and that this crisis, if it plays out in the way that all the
18:12indications suggest it will, could be
18:18the breaking point in the war. And I discussed the situation
18:27where it seems to me that the Ukrainian army is now on the brink of being
18:32encircled or perhaps is encircled already u in Kian where I don’t think
18:37there’s any real doubt any longer where a um where a cauldron is underway in
18:46existence. Even the Institute for the Study of War has published a map which
18:52all but confirms the fact and in Civer where by the way over the last 24 hours
18:58there’s been a cascade of reports from Andre Marsko our old friend and by the
19:03way De Dennis Pushilin as well the head of the Donetsk regional government that
19:09fighting is now taking place within the city limits of Civer itself that there
19:16are now battles was going on inside Civars. The Russian general staff hinted that this was already the case some
19:24about a week ago. But now we’re getting a lot more reports about this, though no
19:30video footage so far. There have, by the way, been some reports, if we’re talking
19:36about Civer, that the Russians have entered the village of Dronovka that
19:42lies to the east of Civer. The Dronovka Dron this village Dronovka is on is
19:51close to the main supply road that goes to Civer ultimately from Slavansk
20:00and well all of that if if true if the Russians really are
20:06fighting inside Dronovka as well as Civas well all of that does indeed point
20:12to a battle that is now reaching its um culminating point. Anyway, I said
20:21that it looked to me as if we were now on a point of at a point of crisis.
20:27And well, shortly after I said that,
20:32um two people who I suspect are probably better informed about the situation than
20:40me basically said the same thing. one was the blogger who writes the Substack
20:47blog events in Ukraine. He’s given an overview of the military situation um on
20:54the battle fronts. Perhaps the greatest emphasis has been on the fighting in Pakovsk and in the area northeast of
21:01Pakovsk where the Russians carried out their breakthrough. He provides a
21:07cascade of comments by Ukrainian uh military commentators and reporters, all
21:14of whom confirm that the situation in Pakovsk and in the area northeast of
21:20Pakovsk is turning critical for Ukraine.
21:26and well he did appear to think that the situation for the Ukrainians is
21:33deteriorating on the battle fronts and he provided significant amount of
21:38information that appeared to support that conclusion from the Ukrainian side.
21:44Um, but perhaps an even more interesting discussion of
21:52the situation on the Ukrainian battlefields comes from the Russian war
21:58reporter Marat Kirulin. I have pointed out how back on the 20th
22:04of March, he wrote an article in which he appeared to outline with startling
22:11accuracy the future offensive that the Russians would conduct
22:18over the course of the summer of 2025 and how many of the things that he
22:24predicted would happen over that the course of that offensive
22:31have indeed happened. Well, in his very
22:36latest piece, which you can also find by the way on his Substack blog blog,
22:44translated again by Zinderf, the person who calls himself Zinderf,
22:50you can see that the same he thinks he said he thinks the same thing. He talks
22:56about how um the Russians
23:01um are now basically
23:08poised to achieve decisive outcomes and how these might be um just over the
23:16horizon. So he says things like this and what can be seen about the situation
23:21uh in the special military operation this well fortified area
23:27in the Donets people’s republic with a developed transport network densely
23:33built up with cities and settlements among uh around numerous industrial
23:39enterprises and mines has been left by the Russian command for development in
23:45the final phase. of the SFMO. That that phase will come when Ukraine’s
23:52economy is destroyed and the armed forces of Ukraine are weakened and
23:57demoralized. That favorable condition will form that then favorable conditions will form for
24:05the cracking of this strong nut. He means Donbass with minimal losses. And that moment is
24:14approaching. Preparations are being made and advantageous lines are being
24:20occupied for the elimination of the last large node of the armed forces of
24:29Ukraine on Donbass territory. And then he has he makes a very interesting
24:38comment which requires I think some unpacking. He says this, “Impatient citizens, of
Analysis of Russian military strategy in Donbass
24:45course, he means Russians, incited by hasty bloggers and experts, and he puts
24:50the word experts in quotation, masks, asked the standard provocative question,
24:56why couldn’t it be done earlier? Dear compatriots, war is primarily about
25:02economics, and the general staff is a huge calculator that constantly calculates, striking the enemy’s
25:09territory, especially deep inside with expensive missiles without coordinating
25:15these actions with operational tactical combat areas is self-destructive.
25:22The enemy has many options to compensate for the damage caused by establishing
25:27detours, redirecting flows, etc. We all know perfectly well that the collective
25:35west is trying to damage our country’s economy, weaken their weaken our armed
25:40forces and eventually destroy us. Therefore, it provoke Therefore,
25:48it that’s to say the west provokes expensive but low offensive actions.
25:56The right time has come. The necessary conditions have been created and the
26:02isolation of the areas of direct interest has begun. The main task is the
26:10demilitarization of Ukraine, the destruction of the
26:16Ukrainian army. Now, as I said, this is very typical Russians
26:22um formulation and as I said, it tells us an awful lot,
26:29but it does require some unpacking. What Kulin is saying is that the Russians are
26:34now at that point where they have occupied
26:41so many important positions and their forces are so are properly ex organized that they can
26:50finally break Ukrainian resistance in Donbass.
26:57And notice how he describes Donbass. He describes Donbass as uh this area um
27:05where um uh uh where there is a developed transport network densely built
27:13built up with cities and settlements around numerous industrial enterprises and mines which is of course is what I
27:21have been saying many times. This is essentially a place of urban sprawl
27:28and therefore very very difficult for armies to maneuver through. And I would
27:34add that there is aspects to the u geology of the area that makes it
27:40difficult for armies to maneuver through as well. There are many rivers and streams, small
27:46rivers and streams. And um this area gets particularly badly water logged in
27:54the autumn and spring periods and u the ground is often very soft and it’s
28:03difficult especially for armored vehicles, tanks and such things to move.
28:10And on that note, by the way, I would just make an observation, which is that we are currently entering the period of
28:17the Rasputita, the period of the autumn mud. It’s come apparently rather early
28:23this year. There’s been quite a lot of rain. There’s an awful lot of fog apparently and um this normally
28:33limits the ability for offensive action.
28:38Except it is not quite turning out this time because there is no evidence that
28:44on this particular occasion on this particular autumn the Russian army is
28:51slowing its offensive in any place and to any degree
29:00it is once again using many more track vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles and
29:07tanks. s to move infantry. Um, infantry
29:13are not marching to the battle places as they have perhaps been doing in recent
29:19months, rather a lot in order to avoid the drones. And we see perhaps rather
29:25less of the motorcycles, but the point is that despite the raspit, despite the
29:31autumn mud, the Russian army continues its advance. I suspect this is partly
29:37because the Russians are able to use track vehicles to a much greater extent
29:43than they have been able to recently in the war because they have gradually got
29:48on top of the whole problem of drones on the battlefield. They have swamped out
29:55the Ukrainian drones from the area, the combat area um on the battlefield. Their
30:04drones dominate. The Ukrainian drones don’t.
30:10And they’ve perfected means to shoot down or jam the Ukrainian drones. Just
30:17saying. But I suspect it is also because the
30:23Russians have now reached the builtup areas in the cities, the last line of
30:30defense that the Ukrainians have in Donbass and in urban areas like Pakovsk, Civer,
30:40Kensk, and Constantin. And over the course of the last 24
30:47hours, uh, Russian comment commentators have started to confirm that fighting is
30:55indeed taking place inside Constantinovka itself. Um, again, the Russian general staff
31:03about a week ago suggested that this was the case, but now we’re finally getting
31:09reports from the Russian bloggers and Telegram channels which appear to be
31:16confirming it, though still we haven’t se received any actual video proof that
31:23this is really the case. Anyway, I suspect that a lot of the fighting
31:28because it is taking place in builtup areas, it it means that the Russians
31:37aren’t affected by the mud so much because of course in a city in an urban
31:47landscape the mud is not such a problem.
31:52On the contrary, there are suggestions that in some parts of the battlefronts,
31:59the fact that we are now in autumn, that there is mist and fog and rain and low
32:06cloud cover is actually helping the Russians because apparently their drones
32:12can operate at least to a certain degree in these conditions whereas the
32:18Ukrainian drones perhaps cannot. And with the Russians
32:24continuously advancing, they can use the mist and the fog and
32:31the low cloud cover to cover their advances.
32:38And it is the Ukrainians who are defending, who are at a disadvantage
32:44when this happens. Anyway, so Kyoulin says that the Russians are now very well
32:52positioned to continue this advance to break the last big defense line in
32:59Dombas. But then going back to that very complicated paragraph in which he
33:07appears to rebuke people who um
33:14talk all the time about the need to um
33:19take even more drastic actions deeper inside the lines. What is he actually
33:25referencing here? He says that striking the enemy’s
33:32territory, especially deep inside with expensive missiles without coordinating
33:39these actions with operational tactical combat areas is selfdestructive.
33:46The enemy has many options to compensate for the damage by establishing detours,
33:53redelecting flows, etc. What one has to do is to coordinate
34:01these strikes on positions behind the front lines with your advance on the
34:09actual battlefield. And he says that the right time to do this is now
34:15approaching. And he says that the objective
34:22is to destroy the Ukrainian army. The main task of the
34:30special military operation is the destruction is the
34:36demilitarization of Ukraine i.e. the destruction of the Ukrainian military.
34:43And then of course the answer which I think explains the whole puzzle is in
34:48the next sentence. One can chase them across enemy territory stretching the
34:54contract contact line and one’s own logistics
35:00thus creating difficulties for oneself. Or one can create conditions so that the
35:08weakened enemy brings their raw material to our machine for processing at their
35:14own expense. One can weaken them by def inflicting defeats in operational and
35:21tactical depth on the march and in concentration areas which our armed
35:28forces are successfully creating. So this I think is a very elliptical
35:37reference to the Neper bridges. He’s basically saying look yes we could have
35:43destroyed the Neper bridges a long long time ago. It would have been possible to do that but at that time we were far
35:51away from the Neper. We were not able to approach the Neper. And the Ukrainians,
35:59had we done that, would always have found some means to get their men and machines and supplies across the NEP.
36:07After all, they are assisted by the West in doing it. They could have set up
36:13pontoon bridges or other types of bridges. It would not have been an
36:18insiderable problem for them. not when the west is working for them. Besides,
36:26our objective is to destroy their armed forces. Now,
36:31I’ve been saying this, we’ve been saying this on the Duran since the outset of
36:36the special military operation that Russian military f philosophy. The
36:43guiding principles that the Russian general staff follows are clausitian
36:52that you break the you achieve victory by breaking the enemy’s will and ability
36:59to continue resistance and you do that by destroying the
37:06enemy’s armed forces. And what Kyulin is saying is that in
37:14order to destroy their armed forces, you can do it in all sorts of ways. You can
37:19advance against them. You can chase them across the battle lines. That will cause you heavy losses and it will put immense
37:27stress on your own logistics.
37:32or you can advance incrementally, causing the enemy
37:39to come to you to try to hold you back. And that way, you’re able to destroy the
37:47enemy, to grind the enemy down, peacemeal on the battlefield in a place of your
37:55own choosing. One can chase them across enemy territory, stretching the contact
38:02line and one’s own logistics, thus creating difficulties for oneself. Or
38:08one can create conditions so that the weakened enemy brings their raw materials, he means their army, their
38:16newly mobilized troops to our machine
38:21for processing at their own expense. If your objective is to destroy the
38:29enemy’s army, then let them keep coming to you so that you can use your enormous
38:38advantage in military equipment and training to
38:43destroy and numbers now to destroy them better and more effectively in that way.
38:52And according to Kyuin that point is now well within distance
Discussion on US military aid and Tomahawk missile implications
39:00of being achieved. So according to this logic, it’s better
39:07not to destroy the bridges, the Neper bridges at this time because you want
39:13the Ukrainians to deploy to eastern Ukraine where you
39:18can destroy them there, not to keep their forces on the west bank of Ukraine
39:26where they are in effect beyond your reach. Now,
39:32a couple of months ago, two or three months ago, Larry Johnson, um, former
39:40CIA analyst and intelligence analyst in the United States, had a very interesting discussion with a Russian
39:46general, a retired Russian general, I believe it was in Moscow, and this general told him essentially the same
39:54thing. It’s a strange tactic from a western point of view because in the
40:00west we conduct war in such a profoundly different way from the way that the
40:06Russians conducted. We do tend to measure progress in t in terms of
40:14territory territory captured cities captured
40:19armies defeated. The Russians measure progress in a completely different way
40:26in terms of the destruction of the enemy’s army and thereby the enemy’s
40:32will to resist. So if you see it in that way, you understand better what Kaiin is
40:40saying. But note again that Kulin is hinting that the point when the Russians
40:47are going to move beyond this is now approaching. The obstacle which is Donbass
40:56is on the brink of being taken and I have discussed in many programs that
41:03there is no other area in Ukraine that exactly corresponds to Donbass. no area
41:09that is as heavily built up, that has so many factories, so many railway lines.
41:14And railway lines, by the way, are an important um barrier to advancing
41:22soldiers because they’re built on small embankments. They can be they’re they’re
41:29in a kind of a way natural defense lines in themselves. There is nothing comparable to that
41:36anywhere else in Ukraine. and
41:42destroying the Ukrainian army there in Donbass and breaking the defenses
41:48in Donbass put the Russians in a position where
41:54they have achieved their primary objective, the destruction of the Ukrainian army and would therefore be in
42:02a position to bring the war to an end. I found this one of Huin’s most
42:08interesting articles. Again, you have to perhaps read a little between the lines
42:13to understand what he’s saying, but I think the ultimate meaning, at least to
42:20me, is fairly clear. Now, just to repeat again, about two or three weeks ago, the
42:27Russians conducted their first major drone attack on a railway bridge across
42:34the Neper River. Or it wasn’t a railway, a a road bridge across the Neper River,
42:40one of the Neper bridges. This was in the town, the city of Kchuk, a major
42:45industrial center. And it was explained to me that quite apart from anything
42:53else, there was a specific target on the bridge that the Russians were targeting.
43:02Though I have no idea what that particular target was, whether it was an
43:08individual or some piece of equipment or something of that kind.
43:14The point what the point is it was nonetheless the first major attack on a
43:21neper bridge and well I thought at the time that it
43:30happened that that might be a signal that more such attacks might be coming
43:38and one way of reading Hulu’s article is to suggest that we are indeed close to
43:44that point because the Russians are now advancing close
43:49closer and closer to the Neper. They’re about to break Ukrainian defense in
43:56Donbass itself. And at that point, it might make sense
44:03to isolate Ukrainian forces in various places by destroying the Neper bridges
44:10and basically trapping them on the east bank of the Neper, which the Russians
44:17mostly control. And in an earlier article, the earlier article that he
44:23wrote back in March, Hulu described exactly how this could be done in
44:29connection with the city of Nepro that Nepro could be placed under siege. It
44:35might not even need to be stormed because destroying the bridges, the
44:43Neper bridges in this specific area of Nepal in the in the city of Nepal would
44:52destroy the entire supply system for Ukraine and would in fact neutralize the
45:00Ukrainian forces in who were still trying to control
45:05Nearro itself, the city of Neapro itself. Anyway, I said yesterday that we
45:12are close to a point of catastrophe in Dombas.
45:18Perhaps Huin and the blogger who writes for events in
45:25Ukraine don’t go quite that far.
45:31But you could see that they also think that a decisive moment is being reached.
45:39Now that may explain all of these very complicated and very
45:44strange diplomatic new moves which continue to take place even as the war
45:51itself grinds on. Now we had more comments from the President of the
45:58United States, Donald Trump. Firstly, he seems to be more optimistic
46:04again that he might be able to achieve some kind of agreement with President Putin.
46:12I don’t know what evidence he has for that because as I’ve discussed in many programs, Putin has up to this point in
46:20time, made no concessions at all, none that we know of in connection with the
46:27ending of the war. He has never at any point compromised on any of the issues
46:33relating to um the final terms for
46:39ending the war. He continues to insist that Ukraine must remain outside NATO,
46:46that the four regions plus Crimea must be transferred to Russia, that Ukraine
46:52must denuclearize, demilitarize, that it must change its political system, that it must restore rights to the Russian
47:00speakers in Ukraine and restore the Russian Orthodox Church. There’s never
47:06been any hint from Putin that he is in the least willing to compromise or
47:13retreat on any of that. And why now would he? His armies, as Kyuin
47:22and others are saying, are now in an
47:28obviously dominant position on the battlefields.
47:34It would make no sense for Putin at this time to make compromises
47:41on points like that. But Trump continues to talk about how yes, some kind of deal
47:48with Putin could be likely. And Trump had some
47:54really rather strange comments to make
47:59on this vexed issue of the Tomahawks. He said that um he expects that there
48:06will be a deal with Putin, but that if there isn’t a deal with Putin, well, he
48:11might in that case be minded to supply Ukraine with tomahawks
48:17and Putin won’t like that at all. The implication being that the Tomahawks are
48:22this enormously devastating, worldchanging, gamechanging weapon system which the
48:30Russians presumably are very afraid of and nervous about.
48:37Now again, it’s not always easy to interpret what Trump is doing, but taken at their
48:47face, it seems to me that Trump’s latest comments rather support the idea that the whole
48:54talk about the Tom Hawks is a bluff. It is a poker game that the Americans, the
49:02Trump is playing with Russ, with the Russians and with Putin. If you don’t do
49:09as I want, I will give Ukraine tomahawks, which sort of implies that
49:17he’s not yet made the decision to give Ukraine tomahawks and that the Ukrainians don’t actually have any
49:24tomahawks. Now, that not only seems to signal that this
49:32whole debate about Tomahawks is something of a bluff, but in a kind of a
49:39way, it rose the whole threat back. It
49:44suggests that the decision to supply tomahawks has not actually been made.
49:52But Trump has not yet made a decision about this. And the Ukrainians
49:58themselves, by the way, in various comments that they have made are also
50:04sort of admitting that Trump has not actually made the decision to supply
50:12tomahawks. Now, I’m going to suggest that this may provide some explanation
50:19for Putin’s conduct, his response to this whole
50:25story about Tomahawks. Now, Putin is obviously extremely well informed and he
50:31has presumably been told by his intelligence people about the problems
50:37the United States would have if it did indeed deploy Tomahawk missiles to
50:42Ukraine. Things that I have discussed and others have discussed in many programs. the fact that there is no
50:50ground launcher for these missiles, that the Typhon system is so huge and
50:58expensive and elaborate that it is to all intents and purposes
51:03incapable of being deployed to Ukraine.
51:08that the lighter, much lighter ground launchers, mobile ground
51:15launchers created for the Tomahawks back in the 1970s when the Tomahawk was a
51:22purely nuclear tech weapon. that these ground launchers were dismantled
51:29way back in the 80s and that there is no real means or method to place them back
51:37in production. It could be done in time, but it will
51:42take a long time to do it and that this might be well perhaps several years
51:50away. And also, yes, the US military,
51:56the US Army did um have a program
52:02between 2023 and 2025 for a mobile ground launched Tomahawk
52:11system. The tomogs still housed in their naval canisters, the ones that they have
52:17when they’re launched from the ships of the US Navy,
52:25which is by the way the only launch system
52:30for the Tomahawk, which I understand is still in existence. But this canister system has proved to
52:39be difficult to transfer to mobile um vehicle to to road mobile vehicles.
52:48Attempts to do it have been done, but this has proved
52:54a major technical and logistical challenge which caused the Pentagon to
53:03cancel that entire program in 2025.
53:08Yes, it’s possible that this could be revived also,
53:13but unless there’s all kinds of secret work being done has been all kinds of
53:20secret work being done to revive or develop this system over the last few
53:25years which we don’t know about which is possible but then we can’t speculate on
53:32that which we don’t know but unless there is there has been that secret work
53:38already been done about the system of which there is no hint. Then again
53:45given the complexity of the technical challenges and what we know about the
53:54challenge challenges the US defense industry has
54:02in placing complex systems of this kind into
54:09production. We’re probably looking at at least a year, probably much longer before um
54:18these systems, these lighter systems um
54:23would be able to enter service and would be able to play an actual role on the
54:30battlefields. So anyway, we have all of these problems and Putin knows about those and he
54:37obviously also knows us has undoubtedly been briefed extensively about how um
54:43simply launching a Tomahawk missile is not a simple matter. How it requires
54:48massive inputs from various levels of the US intelligence and command chain.
54:55Though I suspect Putin by this time in the war can be under no illusions that
55:01if necessary the US would greenlight and participate in all of that. After all,
55:09we now know since the Financial Times has told us
55:15that since July, the United States has been assisting Ukraine to conduct drone
55:23strikes on Russian oil refineries. By the way, there have been some claims
55:28that that article at the Financial Times is wrong, that the information it is giving is
55:34untrue. I have no doubt whatsoever that it is true. I have no doubt at all that
55:42the United States has indeed been assisting and indeed guiding the Ukrainian drone strikes on the Russian
55:50oil refineries. The Russians have been repeatedly saying
55:55for weeks that these kind of attacks on their refineries could not take place
56:00without direct input from the United States. So the Financial Times article
56:06tells us nothing which the Russians have not already been saying and anybody who
56:12has any understanding of this issue knows that without the United States
56:19almost certainly it could not be done. So I doubt that Putin has any doubts
56:25about the willingness of the United States to participate to involve itself
56:32in command and guidance decisions where Tomahawk missiles are concerned. But he
56:37probably does know or believe that actual deployment of these systems is
56:46probably at least a year away and perhaps much longer. So given that this
56:53is so he probably realizes that Trump is bluffing that this is all a bluff that
57:00Trump is using the threat of the Tomahawk missile deliveries to Russia in
57:07order to extract concessions. and Putin and the people around him are
57:15saying to themselves, well, the way we deal with this is by
57:22showing to the Americans that we are not in fact intimidated by what the
57:28Americans are threatening to do. So instead of running around and saying
57:33well you know if the Toml missiles are sent to Ukraine this will be a
57:39tremendous disaster it will be a military crisis. Uh we will have to take
57:46extremely strong counter measures. The Russians are perhaps saying or at least
57:51the people around Putin are perhaps saying that the correct way to respond
57:56to this is to play it down. to say, “Well, these systems are old. They are
58:04easy to intercept. Our air defense system will have no trouble dealing with
58:11these missiles. Let’s not give Trump any reason to think
58:22that by threatening us with Tomahawk missiles,
58:27we are rattled and nervous and perhaps
58:35ready to make concessions. I will come to how that approach plays
58:43in Russia in a moment. Now if this is correct
58:50then there is some kind of going ting
58:55and fro there is some ting and froing going on behind the scenes between the Americans and the Russians. The
59:02Russians, the Americans are saying, or at least Trump’s people are saying,
59:09agree to freeze the conflict or we will launch get tomahawks against you. The
59:17Russians saying, “We don’t care. Bring it on. We’re going to press forward with
59:23the war in the meantime.” So all of that might be taking place and
59:32there might be those kind of contexts. But I come back to the wider Russian
59:39response in all of this because though I can understand
59:44why Putin himself might be taking this approach, he might be saying that a
59:50stronger reaction to rumors about Tomahawk deployments will
59:57actually play into the hands of the hardliners in the United States. They
1:00:02will seize on it as evidence that Putin and the Russians are rattled and that
1:00:08will make them even more determined to send the tomahawks in order to escalate the war. But I while I can understand
1:00:17why Putin himself might make that calculation, I doubt that many other
1:00:22people in Russia are making it. I suspect that many people in Russia are
1:00:28saying, “What is the point of all of this?” Trump is already orchestrating
1:00:34attacks on our oil refineries. He wants to supply Ukraine with Tomahawk
1:00:40missiles. He’s talking about doing it. Even if
1:00:47it’s quite true that telling Trump don’t do this or else is more likely to make
1:00:54Trump go ahead and do this. And even if you don’t want to give the impression
1:01:02that you’re rattled by this threat of Tomahawk missiles, does it not make far
1:01:09better sense to say to yourself, also negotiations with the United States of any kind make
1:01:18no sense anymore? Trump really isn’t listening to what we
1:01:25are saying. isn’t listening to us about Istanbul plus our various demands. He
1:01:33doesn’t really want to address our underlying concerns, what we call the
1:01:39root causes of the conflict. And for that reason,
1:01:46further contacts with the Americans are pointless and we should focus
1:01:53instead on the wall. And
1:01:58not only is that debate, I have no doubt at all, taking place in Moscow, but we
1:02:03saw how, as I discussed in my recent program, Putin is having
1:02:11Putin is going along with part of this. I have no doubt that the Russians do
1:02:17have a plan when they reach the Neper to cross the Neper and to move to try to
1:02:25take control of the remainder of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast and Adessa and
1:02:31Nikolai and other places and all of the others those other places
1:02:37as well. And I have no doubt that that plan exists. And I am confident that
1:02:46when he met with the generals in St. Petersburg, Putin did indeed tell them,
1:02:54″You have my green light to work towards it and to go ahead with
1:03:01it.” But I think that Putin at the same time
1:03:08still wants to sort out relations with the United States, still hopes to come
1:03:15to some agreement with the United States in order to secure Russia’s western
1:03:23border. And though it is frustrating to many people in Moscow, he still speaks
1:03:29about an eventually an eventual understanding with Donald
1:03:36Trump and the Americans. And here I’m going to say where again I think the
1:03:42major misunderstanding Putin and the Russians might have comes
1:03:48from. I’ve developed the impression from some of the things that Lavough and
1:03:54other Russians have said about the meeting in Anchorage that Putin and the
1:04:00Russians came away with from that meeting thinking that Trump is prepared
1:04:08to negotiate over the future security architecture in Europe. And I think
1:04:15Putin doesn’t want to jeopardize that negotiation when it eventually happens.
1:04:23But I think again this is a red herring
1:04:28because I don’t think that Donald Trump or anyone else in the West in the United
1:04:34States is in fact interested in holding with that Russians that kind of
1:04:40conversation or that sort of negotiation. Putin almost certainly brought all of
1:04:48that up over the course of the Anchorage meeting.
1:04:54Trump, as he always does, seem to agree. Putin came away with an impression that
1:05:02he’d reached an understanding with Trump on this precise issue, except I don’t
1:05:09think in fact he really did. Now, in the meantime, tensions in Europe
1:05:17continue to be extraordinarily high, but there’s a number of things to say.
1:05:24I’m going to discuss the deterioration of China US relations in a moment. But
1:05:32the key thing to take from what has happened between China and the United States over
1:05:38the last couple of days is that it should bury once and for all any idea
1:05:46that the United States can use China to exert leverage over Russia. The Chinese
1:05:54made a very deliberate step, took a very deliberate step
1:05:59to restrict rare earth exports to the United States. They must have known that
1:06:06this would provoke an extremely strong reaction from the United States. The
1:06:11entire mood in Beijing, as we will see shortly, about a trade war with the
1:06:16United States is bring it on. Now, if that is correct, then
1:06:23any idea that the United States is going to be able to force China to stop
1:06:30imports of energy from Russia or to be buried.
1:06:38Far from the Chinese being intimidated by those kind of
1:06:44tariff threats, we have seen that on the contrary and on a completely different
1:06:51set of reasons, they have preempted what the Americans might do and it is the
1:06:57Americans who are now trying desperately to find a
1:07:04walk back. So that’s one thing I want to say. The sanctions threat has basically melted
1:07:13away. Even the ideas of seizing ships on the high seas, Russian tankers on the
1:07:20high seas, even that idea is apparently encountering massive problems
1:07:28and grave doubts within Europe and is being quietly dropped. I ought to
1:07:37say that apparently there’s been investigations of the various drone
1:07:44incidents over the various airports in Germany, in Denmark, etc.
1:07:51Um, the consensus that appears to be developing amongst
1:07:59Western law enforcement agencies from what I can see is that the Russians were
1:08:05not involved. And well, as for that incident of the
1:08:12Russian of the ship carrying the Russian oil that was seized by the French,
1:08:18there’s been a scathing article about this incident in the Spectator, the
1:08:23British political newspaper. But anyway, the point is that no
1:08:29evidence that this ship was involved in any kind of illicit drone activities was
1:08:36found. So the rhetoric against Russia remains intense,
1:08:41but perhaps because people in Europe are again going
1:08:48through that process of starting to understand that
1:08:54they have really very little leverage and that a clash with the Russians in
1:09:02military terms would be an extremely bad idea. here. It looks to me as if for the
1:09:09moment at least the tension is slightly abating. Now let’s return to the issue of China
1:09:19and the United States. Um we’ve had a long editorial about this issue um in
1:09:26Global Times and Global Times made it very clear that as
1:09:34far as the Chinese are concerned the decision by China on Friday to
1:09:41tighten controls of exports of rare earths
1:09:48they have made that decision. in response to what they see
1:09:55as aggressive moves by the Americans.
1:10:01They say this, the incident stemmed from Washington’s threat to impose tariffs of
1:10:07100% on China and export control on all
1:10:12critical software under the pretext of countering China’s tightening of rare
1:10:19earth export regulations. Viewed from a longer time frame, it is
1:10:26the United States that has persistently used tariffs and expert export controls
1:10:32to interfere with and undermine the normal trade order between China and the
1:10:38United States as well as the atmosphere of bilateral economic and trade talks,
1:10:44seriously harming China’s interests since the China US economic and trade
1:10:53talks in Madrid in September. The United States in just 20 days has
1:11:02introduced a string of new restrictive measures targeting China. The
1:11:09difficulties currently facing China US related trade are entirely the
1:11:17responsibility of the US side.
1:11:22China has repeatedly made it clear that its export control measures on rare
1:11:28earths and related items is a legitimate action by the Chinese government to
1:11:34refine its export control system in accordance with trade with laws and
1:11:41regulations. These actions are not only necessary to safeguard national security
1:11:47but also fully demonstrate China’s steadfast commitment as a responsible
1:11:54major country to pursue world peace. And
1:12:00then the article con continues, “The US has long overextended the concept of
1:12:05national security, misused export controls, adopted discriminatory
1:12:10practices towards China, imposed long armed jurisdiction measures on a wide
1:12:16range of products, including semiconductor equipment and chips. Yet
1:12:21it has hypocritically criticized China’s normal regulatory measures and economic
1:12:29and trade relations have been a journey full of twists and turns. Um and though
1:12:36China obviously wants better relations
1:12:41um China will not be pushed around. Um, China uh stands firm in its position,
1:12:50clear in red clear in its red lines, focused on the broader stability of the
1:12:55international trading order, the United States, by contrast reacts emotionally,
1:13:01lacking effective policy tools mired in double standards.
1:13:08Well, if the United States continues to pursue unilateral measures conduct
1:13:15guided by a zero sum mindset, it will only further disrupt global supply
1:13:22chains harming others without benefiting itself. So what the Chinese are
1:13:28basically saying here is enough was enough. We came to a what we thought was a deal with the Americans as recently as
1:13:36September in Madrid to ease off our tariffs. Um this is after each side
1:13:45agreed to reduce tariffs back in June.
1:13:51And what instead has been happening since then, since September, is that the
1:13:56Americans have got back to the habit of salami slicing, export
1:14:02controls on technology, further restrictions on Chinese exports.
1:14:08I discussed um yesterday the fees the ships built in
1:14:16Chinese sip shipyards might now face if they come to um US ports. And well, just
1:14:25the other day, I think it was even yesterday maybe, the Dutch government um took over control of
1:14:35a Chinese semiconductor company using again national security
1:14:42as an excuse to do so. So, the Chinese said enough’s enough. Two can play at
1:14:48this game. If the United States continues to go down this route, we’re going to expo impose export controls on
1:14:57rare earths, we know what the effect of that is going to be on the US defense
1:15:03industry. We know what the effect of that is going to be on the US AI
1:15:10industry dependent on chips which depend on rare earths.
1:15:17So, we’re going to take all of these measures because we’re not going to tolerate this backsliding
1:15:25and deviousness and salami tactics from the Americans anymore. Well, to anybody
1:15:33who knows about China, none of that is surprising, but the interesting thing is to track the American reaction. Um, on
1:15:41Friday, President Trump publishes an absolutely enraged post on True Social.
1:15:49He then follows up with an announcement the following day that on the 1st of
1:15:55November he’s going to impose 100% tariffs on China again. Then the next
1:16:02set of comments is well actually relations between China and the United States continue to be good. His personal
1:16:09relations with Presidency are fine and he’s still looking forward to meeting with Presidency in the Apex summit in
1:16:18South Korea in two weeks time. In other words, just as happened in June, the
1:16:27Americans are retreating. The Chinese have
1:16:33a winning card which is their monopoly for the moment
1:16:38on rare earths. Now I understand that exports of rare earths by China and
1:16:46imports of rare earths by the United States from China accounts for only a
1:16:53small part of Ukraine’s of the sorry of the US is GDP not Ukraine’s the US’s GDP
1:17:02but of course that is to use a misleading measure because even if the
1:17:09cost of these these rare earth supplies relative to the enormous US GDP number
1:17:15is very small. If you need these rare earths to build F-35 fighter jets and to
1:17:25make AI chips, then you have very great problems if you
1:17:34don’t receive them. Yes, the rest of your economy can continue as always, but
1:17:41it doesn’t mean that there aren’t going to be economic consequences. According
1:17:47to some calculations, 40% of growth in the US economy this
1:17:52year is entirely the product of the speculative boom in the US stock market
1:18:00on AI. If you can’t get the chips and you can’t
1:18:07get the AI, what happens to that boom?
1:18:12Um, what happens to your wider defense industry? You’ve run down your stock
1:18:19piles because you’ve given so many weapons to Ukraine. You need to boost production in all kinds of ways. You
1:18:26need to support Israel in all sorts of ways. So you don’t really have those
1:18:34many cards to play. So unsurprisingly,
1:18:40once the anger has subsided, Trump is trying to retreat and trying to
1:18:49find a way back. Now, when I read his truth social his latest truth social
1:18:54post, I thought that there might actually have been a conversation between him and Cining, and I’m still
1:19:00not absolutely sure that there hasn’t been, but it seems not. in which case
1:19:07the retreat that Trump is beating
1:19:13is even more is even more obvious than it would
1:19:19otherwise be. Now, if the United States
1:19:25cannot impose tariffs in response to
1:19:32restrictions by China on exports of rare earths, if it is so nervous,
1:19:39if it understands the potentially grave crisis in its
1:19:45economy, if it catapults itself into that kind
1:19:51trade war with China at this time. How is he going to risk imposing major
1:19:58tariffs and sanctions against China because say China buys Russian oil or
1:20:09sells drone technology and perhaps sophisticated chips to Russia.
1:20:16It can’t be done. And I think that many
1:20:22people in the United States perhaps understand that and I can’t help but
1:20:27think that that together with the deteriorating military situation is what
1:20:33probably explains this whole nonsense about tomahawk missiles. You can’t scare
1:20:40the Russians with sanctions and tariffs and you’ve provided Ukraine with every
1:20:47conceivable weapon that Ukraine has asked for. Threaten the Russians with
1:20:52tomahawk missiles and hope that that will buy you some leverage,
1:20:58which of course it won’t. Now saying all of this I want to repeat
1:21:04again what I said in my program yesterday that we are at a decisive moment in the war. In fact, I read on a
1:21:14Russian telegram channel that the situation in Pacros as of the time of
1:21:19making of this program is starting to bear a close resemblance to the
1:21:27situation in ADFA um two years ago just before that
1:21:34fortified cities fall, fortified towns fall and
1:21:41Devka was an extremely important defense position for the Ukrainians,
1:21:48but Pakovsk is an order of magnitude more important still. After all, it’s
1:21:55much bigger if nothing else. So if Trump wants to avoid a disaster in
1:22:02Ukraine, a political disaster in Ukraine, he should not be wasting time
1:22:08talking about Tomahawk missiles. He ought to be calling Putin and calling
1:22:13Zilinski and say, “Look, Vladimir, whichever Vladimir it is he’s talking
1:22:19to, Tomahawks are really not an option. Let’s instead
1:22:25do what we ought to have done previously, which is to negotiate with the Russians
1:22:34on the basis that Putin outlined a year and a few months ago when he spoke to
1:22:42the foreign ministry on the 14th of June, 2024 and outlined Russia’s conditions for
1:22:50ending the war. In all other respects, the war is lost. Tomahawk missiles are
1:22:56not going to change the situation. They’re a reckless and dangerous thing to be doing. And in the meantime, the
1:23:05mere discussion of them is put is putting Putin in an increasingly
1:23:11difficult condition where it becomes more problematic for him to pursue
1:23:18some kind of reprosh for for with the United States than it
1:23:25might otherwise be. So let’s end all of that. Let’s talk instead. Let’s
1:23:33negotiate finally in a serious way, accepting that the war is is essentially
1:23:40lost and seeing what we can nonetheless agree. Well, Trump isn’t doing that. I
1:23:46don’t think Zalinski will ever do that. I think the Europeans won’t do it either. And I mention these things with
1:23:54no real hope that anything like this will happen. But I think this is the
1:24:02point to make. If Tomahawk missiles are a bluff, it’s a dangerous and ultimately
1:24:11pointless bluff. At worst, it will harden the Russian position. At best, it
1:24:19will simply mean that the Russians will continue the war until they achieve
1:24:25their victory. and reach the Neper and across the Neeper and move on to Adessa
1:24:32and the Black Sea and all of that. And
1:24:37at the same time, taking these kind of steps, talking
1:24:43about Tomahawk missiles is increasing hopes in Europe and in Ukraine that
1:24:52prolongs a war which is already lost. Anyway, that is what I think and this is
Conclusion and summary of key points discussed
1:24:59where I’m going to finish today’s program. There’ll be more from me tomorrow. As always, in the meantime,
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1:25:29very good day.