Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald

I visited the Maritime Museum in Bayfield Wisconsin, right on the shores of Lake Superior. The curator of the museum gave me some information on the wreck, which was mind-blousing considering I have never seen it released before, he was present during the investigation, but not part of the investigation.

I did quite a bit of research that night, but did not come to a final conclusion.

https://media.mlive.com/news_impact/other/Edmund%20Fitzgerald%20CG-NTSB%20report.pdf

Design and construction

attached file shows lengthening

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Edmund_Fitzgerald?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, invested in the iron and minerals industries on a large scale, including the construction of Edmund Fitzgerald, which represented the first such investment by any American life insurance company.^[9] In 1957, they contracted Great Lakes Engineering Works (GLEW), of River Rouge, Michigan, to design and construct the ship “within a foot of the maximum length allowed for passage through the soon-to-be completed Saint Lawrence Seaway.”^[10] The ship’s value at that time was $7 million (equivalent to $58.1 million in 2023).^[11] Edmund Fitzgerald was the first laker built to the maximum St. Lawrence Seaway size,^[12] which was 730 feet (222.5 m) long, 75 feet (22.9 m) wide, and with a 25 foot (7.6 m) draft.^[13] The moulded depth (roughly speaking, the vertical height of the hull) was 39 ft (12 m).^[5] The hold depth (the inside height of the cargo hold) was 33 ft 4 in (10.16 m).^[5][6] GLEW laid the first keel plate on August 7 the same year.^[14]

With a deadweight capacity of 26,000 long tons (29,120 short tons; 26,417 t),^[6] and a 729-foot (222 m) hull, Edmund Fitzgerald was the longest ship on the Great Lakes, earning her the title Queen of the Lakes^[12] until September 17, 1959, when the 730-foot (222.5 m) SS Murray Bay was launched.^[15] Edmund Fitzgerald‘s three central cargo holds^[16] were loaded through 21 watertight cargo hatches, each 11 by 48 feet (3.4 by 14.6 m) of ⁵⁄₁₆-inch-thick (7.9 mm) steel.^[17] Originally coal-fired, her boilers were converted to burn oil during the 1971–72 winter layup.^[18] In 1969, the ship’s maneuverability was improved by the installation of a diesel-powered bow thruster.^[19]

By ore freighter standards, the interior of Edmund Fitzgerald was luxurious. Her J.L. Hudson Company–designed furnishings^[20] included deep pile carpeting, tiled bathrooms, drapes over the portholes, and leather swivel chairs in the guest lounge. There were two guest staterooms for passengers. Air conditioning extended to the crew quarters, which featured more amenities than usual. A large galley and fully stocked pantry supplied meals for two dining rooms. Edmund Fitzgerald‘s pilothouse was outfitted with “state-of-the-art nautical equipment and a beautiful map room.”^[21]

Name and launch

Northwestern Mutual wanted to name the ship after its president and chairman of the board, Edmund Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald’s own grandfather and all great uncles had themselves been lake captains,^[22] and his father owned the Milwaukee Drydock Company, which built and repaired ships.^[23] Fitzgerald had attempted to dissuade the naming of the ship after himself, proposing the names Centennial, Seaway, Milwaukee and Northwestern. The board was resolute, and Edmund abstained from voting; the 36 board members voted unanimously to name her the SS Edmund Fitzgerald.^[24] More than 15,000 people attended Edmund Fitzgerald‘s christening and launch ceremony on June 7, 1958. The event was plagued by misfortunes. When Elizabeth Fitzgerald, wife of Edmund Fitzgerald, tried to christen the ship by smashing a champagne bottle over the bow, it took her three attempts to break it. A delay of 36 minutes followed while the shipyard crew struggled to release the keel blocks. Upon sideways launch, the ship created a large wave, dousing the spectators, then crashed into a pier before righting herself. Other witnesses later said they swore the ship was “trying to climb right out of the water”.^[25] On September 22, 1958, Edmund Fitzgerald completed nine days of sea trials.^[26]

Career

Northwestern Mutual’s normal practice was to purchase ships for operation by other companies.^[27] In Edmund Fitzgerald‘s case, they signed a 25-year contract with Oglebay Norton Corporation to operate the vessel.^[16] Oglebay Norton immediately designated Edmund Fitzgerald the flagship of its Columbia Transportation fleet.^[21]

Edmund Fitzgerald was a record-setting workhorse, often beating her own milestones.^[6] The vessel’s record load for a single trip was 27,402 long tons (30,690 short tons; 27,842 t) in 1969.^[6] For 17 years, Edmund Fitzgerald carried taconite from Minnesota’s Iron Range mines near Duluth, Minnesota, to iron works in Detroit, Toledo, and other ports. She set seasonal haul records six different times.^[7] Her nicknames included “Fitz”, “Pride of the American Side”,^[28] “Mighty Fitz”, “Toledo Express”,^[29] “Big Fitz”,^[30] and the “Titanic of the Great Lakes”.^[31] Loading Edmund Fitzgerald with taconite pellets took about four and a half hours, while unloading took around 14 hours. A round trip between Superior, Wisconsin, and Detroit, Michigan, usually took her five days and she averaged 47 similar trips per season.^[32] The vessel’s usual route was between Superior, Wisconsin, and Toledo, Ohio, although her port of destination could vary.^[29] By November 1975, Edmund Fitzgerald had logged an estimated 748 round trips on the Great Lakes and covered more than a million miles, “a distance roughly equivalent to 44 trips around the world.”^[33]

Up until a few weeks before her loss, passengers had traveled on board as company guests. Frederick Stonehouse wrote:

Stewards treated the guests to the entire VIP routine. The cuisine was reportedly excellent and snacks were always available in the lounge. A small but well-stocked kitchenette provided the drinks. Once each trip, the captain held a candlelight dinner for the guests, complete with mess-jacketed stewards and special “clamdigger” punch.^[34]

Because of her size, appearance, string of records, and “DJ captain,”^[6] Edmund Fitzgerald became a favorite of boat watchers throughout her career. Although Captain Peter Pulcer was in command of Edmund Fitzgerald on trips when cargo records were set, “he is best remembered … for piping music day or night over the ship’s intercom system” while passing through the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers.^[6] While navigating the Soo Locks he would often come out of the pilothouse and use a bullhorn to entertain tourists with a commentary on details about Edmund Fitzgerald.^[6]

In 1969, Edmund Fitzgerald received a safety award for eight years of operation without a time-off worker injury.^[6] The vessel ran aground in 1969, and she collided with SS Hochelaga in 1970. Later that same year, she struck the wall of a lock, an accident repeated in 1973 and 1974. On January 7, 1974, she lost her original bow anchor in the Detroit River.^[35] None of these mishaps were considered serious or unusual.^[36] Freshwater ships are built to last more than half a century, and Edmund Fitzgerald would have still had a long career ahead of her when she sank.^[9]

Final voyage and wreck

Wikimedia | © OpenStreetMap

200km
124miles

Wreck location

Ernest M. McSorley (September 29, 1912 – November 10, 1975) was the last captain of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald, perishing along with the other 28 members of his crew on November 10, 1975.^[37][38] Edmund Fitzgerald left Superior, Wisconsin, at 2:15 p.m. on the afternoon of November 9, 1975,^[39] under the command of Captain McSorley. She was en route to the steel mill on Zug Island, near Detroit, Michigan,^[40] with a cargo of 26,116 long tons (29,250 short tons; 26,535 t) of taconite ore pellets and soon reached her full speed of 16.3 miles per hour (14.2 kn; 26.2 km/h).^[41] Around 5 p.m., Edmund Fitzgerald joined a second freighter under the command of Captain Jesse B. “Bernie” Cooper, Arthur M. Anderson, destined for Gary, Indiana, out of Two Harbors, Minnesota.^[42] The weather forecast was not unusual for November and the National Weather Service (NWS) predicted that a storm would pass just south of Lake Superior by 7 a.m. on November 10.^[43]

SS Wilfred Sykes loaded opposite Edmund Fitzgerald at the Burlington Northern Dock #1 and departed at 4:15 p.m., about two hours after Edmund Fitzgerald. In contrast to the NWS forecast, Captain Dudley J. Paquette of Wilfred Sykes predicted that a major storm would directly cross Lake Superior. From the outset, he chose a route that took advantage of the protection offered by the lake’s north shore to avoid the worst effects of the storm. The crew of Wilfred Sykes followed the radio conversations between Edmund Fitzgerald and Arthur M. Anderson during the first part of their trip and overheard their captains deciding to take the regular Lake Carriers’ Association downbound route.^[44] The NWS altered its forecast at 7:00 p.m., issuing gale warnings for the whole of Lake Superior.^[45] Arthur M. Anderson and Edmund Fitzgerald altered course northward, seeking shelter along the Ontario shore,^[42] where they encountered a winter storm at 1:00 a.m. on November 10. Edmund Fitzgerald reported winds of 52 knots (96 km/h; 60 mph) and waves 10 feet (3.0 m) high.^[46] Captain Paquette of Wilfred Sykes reported that after 1 a.m., he overheard McSorley say that he had reduced the ship’s speed because of the rough conditions. Paquette said he was stunned to later hear McSorley, who was not known for turning aside or slowing down, state that “we’re going to try for some lee from Isle Royale. You’re walking away from us anyway … I can’t stay with you.”^[44]

At 2:00 a.m. on November 10, the NWS upgraded its warnings from gale to storm, forecasting winds of 35–50 knots (65–93 km/h; 40–58 mph).^[47] Until then, Edmund Fitzgerald had followed Arthur M. Anderson, which was travelling at a constant 14.6 miles per hour (12.7 kn; 23.5 km/h),^[42] but the faster Edmund Fitzgerald pulled ahead at about 3:00 a.m.^[48] As the storm center passed over the ships, they experienced shifting winds, with wind speeds temporarily dropping as wind direction changed from northeast to south and then northwest.^[46] After 1:50 p.m., when Arthur M. Anderson logged winds of 50 knots (93 km/h; 58 mph), wind speeds again picked up rapidly, and it began to snow at 2:45 p.m., reducing visibility; Arthur M. Anderson lost sight of Edmund Fitzgerald, which was about 16 miles (26 km) ahead at the time.^[49]

Shortly after 3:30 p.m., Captain McSorley radioed Arthur M. Anderson to report that Edmund Fitzgerald was taking on water and had lost two vent covers and a fence railing. The vessel had also developed a list.^[50] Two of Edmund Fitzgerald‘s six bilge pumps ran continuously to discharge shipped water.^[51] McSorley said that he would slow his ship down so that Arthur M. Anderson could close the gap between them.^[50] In a broadcast shortly afterward, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) warned all shipping that the Soo Locks had been closed and they should seek safe anchorage. Shortly after 4:10 p.m., McSorley called Arthur M. Anderson again to report a radar failure and asked Arthur M. Anderson to keep track of them.^[52] Edmund Fitzgerald, effectively blind, slowed to let Arthur M. Anderson come within a 10-mile (16 km) range so she could receive radar guidance from the other ship.^[53]

For a time, Arthur M. Anderson directed Edmund Fitzgerald toward the relative safety of Whitefish Bay; then, at 4:39 p.m., McSorley contacted the USCG station in Grand Marais, Michigan, to inquire whether the Whitefish Point light and navigation beacon were operational. The USCG replied that their monitoring equipment indicated that both instruments were inactive.^[54] McSorley then hailed any ships in the Whitefish Point area to report the state of the navigational aids, receiving an answer from Captain Cedric Woodard of Avafors between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. that the Whitefish Point light was on but not the radio beacon.^[48] Woodard testified to the Marine Board that he overheard McSorley say, “Don’t allow nobody on deck,”^[55] as well as something about a vent that Woodard could not understand.^[56] Some time later, McSorley told Woodard, “I have a ‘bad list’, I have lost both radars, and am taking heavy seas over the deck in one of the worst seas I have ever been in.”^[57]

By late in the afternoon of November 10, sustained winds of over 50 knots (93 km/h; 58 mph) were recorded by ships and observation points across eastern Lake Superior.^[58] Arthur M. Anderson logged sustained winds as high as 58 knots (107 km/h; 67 mph) at 4:52 p.m.,^[52] while waves increased to as high as 25 feet (7.6 m) by 6:00 p.m.^[59] Arthur M. Anderson was also struck by 70-to-75-knot (130 to 139 km/h; 81 to 86 mph) gusts^[58] and rogue waves as high as 35 feet (11 m).^[60]

At approximately 7:10 p.m., when Arthur M. Anderson notified Edmund Fitzgerald of an upbound ship and asked how she was doing, McSorley reported, “We are holding our own.” She was never heard from again. No distress signal was received, and ten minutes later, Arthur M. Anderson lost the ability either to reach Edmund Fitzgerald by radio or to detect her on radar.^[55]

Search

Captain Cooper of Arthur M. Anderson first called the USCG in Sault Ste. Marie at 7:39 p.m. on channel 16, the radio distress frequency. The USCG responders instructed him to call back on channel 12 because they wanted to keep their emergency channel open and they were having difficulty with their communication systems, including antennas blown down by the storm.^[61] Cooper then contacted the upbound saltwater vessel Nanfri and was told that she could not pick up Edmund Fitzgerald on her radar either. Despite repeated attempts to raise the USCG, Cooper was not successful until 7:54 p.m. when the officer on duty asked him to keep watch for a 16-foot (4.9 m) boat lost in the area.^[62] At about 8:25 p.m., Cooper again called the USCG to express his concern about Edmund Fitzgerald^[63] and at 9:03 p.m. reported her missing.^[64] Petty Officer Philip Branch later testified, “I considered it serious, but at the time it was not urgent.”^[65]

Lacking appropriate search-and-rescue vessels to respond to Edmund Fitzgerald‘s disaster,^[65] at approximately 9:00 p.m., the USCG asked Arthur M. Anderson to turn around and look for survivors. Around 10:30 p.m., the USCG asked all commercial vessels anchored in or near Whitefish Bay to assist in the search.^[66] The initial search for survivors was carried out by Arthur M. Anderson, and a second freighter, SS William Clay Ford. The efforts of a third freighter, the Toronto-registered SS Hilda Marjanne, were foiled by the weather. The USCG sent a buoy tender, Woodrush, from Duluth, Minnesota, but it took two and a half hours to launch and a day to travel to the search area. The Traverse City, Michigan, USCG station launched an HU-16 fixed-wing search aircraft that arrived on the scene at 10:53 p.m. while an HH-52 USCG helicopter with a 3.8-million-candlepower searchlight arrived at 1:00 a.m. on November 11.^[67] Canadian Coast Guard aircraft joined the three-day search and the Ontario Provincial Police established and maintained a beach patrol all along the eastern shore of Lake Superior.^[68]

Although the search recovered debris, including lifeboats and rafts, none of the crew were found.^[69] On her final voyage, Edmund Fitzgerald‘s crew of 29 consisted of the captain; the first, second, and third mates; five engineers; three oilers; a cook; a wiper; two maintenance men; three watchmen; three deckhands; three wheelsmen; two porters; a cadet; and a steward. Most of the crew were from Ohio and Wisconsin;^[70] their ages ranged from 20 (watchman Karl A. Peckol) to 63 (Captain McSorley).^[71]

Edmund Fitzgerald is among the largest and best-known vessels lost on the Great Lakes,^[72] but she is not alone on the Lake Superior seabed in that area. In the years between 1816, when Invincible was lost, and 1975, when Edmund Fitzgerald sank, the Whitefish Point area had claimed at least 240 ships.^[73]

Wreck discovery and surveys

Wreck discovery

A U.S. Navy Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft, piloted by Lt. George Conner and equipped to detect magnetic anomalies usually associated with submarines, found the wreck on November 14, 1975 in Canadian waters close to the international boundary at a depth of 530 feet (160 m). Edmund Fitzgerald lies about 15 miles (13 nmi; 24 km) west of Deadman’s Cove, Ontario; about 8 miles (7.0 nmi; 13 km) northwest of Pancake Bay Provincial Park; and 17 miles (15 nmi; 27 km) from the entrance to Whitefish Bay to the southeast.^[55] A further November 14–16 survey by the USCG using a side scan sonar revealed two large objects lying close together on the lake floor. The U.S. Navy also contracted Seaward, Inc., to conduct a second survey between November 22 and 25.^[74]

Underwater surveys

From May 20 to 28, 1976, the U.S. Navy dived on the wreck using its unmanned submersible, CURV-III, and found Edmund Fitzgerald lying in two large pieces in 530 feet (160 m) of water. Navy estimates put the length of the bow section at 276 feet (84 m) and that of the stern section at 253 feet (77 m). The bow section stood upright in the mud, some 170 feet (52 m) from the stern section that lay capsized at a 50-degree angle from the bow. In between the two broken sections lay a large mass of taconite pellets and scattered wreckage lying about, including hatch covers and hull plating.^[75]

In 1980, during a Lake Superior research dive expedition, marine explorer Jean-Michel Cousteau, the son of Jacques Cousteau, sent two divers from RV Calypso in the first manned submersible dive to Edmund Fitzgerald.^[76] The dive was brief, and although the dive team drew no final conclusions, they speculated that Edmund Fitzgerald had broken up on the surface.^[77]

The Michigan Sea Grant Program organized a three-day dive to survey Edmund Fitzgerald in 1989. The primary objective was to record 3-D videotape for use in museum educational programs and the production of documentaries. The expedition used a towed survey system (TSS Mk1) and a self-propelled, tethered, free-swimming remotely operated underwater vehicle (ROV). The Mini Rover ROV was equipped with miniature stereoscopic cameras and wide-angle lenses in order to produce 3-D images. The towed survey system and the Mini Rover ROV were designed, built and operated by Chris Nicholson of Deep Sea Systems International, Inc.^[78] Participants included the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Geographic Society, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Great Lakes Shipwreck Historical Society (GLSHS), and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the latter providing RV Grayling as the support vessel for the ROV.^[79] The GLSHS used part of the five hours of video footage produced during the dives in a documentary and the National Geographic Society used a segment in a broadcast. Frederick Stonehouse, who wrote one of the first books on the Edmund Fitzgerald wreck, moderated a 1990 panel review of the video that drew no conclusions about the cause of Edmund Fitzgerald‘s sinking.^[80]

Canadian explorer Joseph B. MacInnis organized and led six publicly funded dives to Edmund Fitzgerald over a three-day period in 1994.^[81] Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institution provided Edwin A. Link as the support vessel, and their manned submersible, Celia.^[79] The GLSHS paid $10,000 for three of its members to each join a dive and take still pictures.^[82] MacInnis concluded that the notes and video obtained during the dives did not provide an explanation why Edmund Fitzgerald sank.^[83] The same year, longtime sport diver Fred Shannon formed Deepquest Ltd., and organized a privately funded dive to the wreck of Edmund Fitzgerald, using Delta Oceanographic’s submersible, Delta.^[84] Deepquest Ltd. conducted seven dives and took more than 42 hours of underwater video^[85] while Shannon set the record for the longest submersible dive to Edmund Fitzgerald at 211 minutes.^[86] Prior to conducting the dives, Shannon studied NOAA navigational charts and found that the international boundary had changed three times before its publication by NOAA in 1976.^[87] Shannon determined that based on GPS coordinates from the 1994 Deepquest expedition, “at least one-third of the two acres of immediate wreckage containing the two major portions of the vessel is in U.S. waters because of an error in the position of the U.S.–Canada boundary line shown on official lake charts.”^[88]

Shannon’s group discovered the remains of a crew member partly dressed in coveralls and wearing a life jacket alongside the bow of the ship, indicating that at least one of the crew was aware of the possibility of sinking.^[89][90] The life jacket had deteriorated canvas and “what is thought to be six rectangular cork blocks … clearly visible.”^[91] Shannon concluded that “massive and advancing structural failure” caused Edmund Fitzgerald to break apart on the surface and sink.^[40]

MacInnis led another series of dives in 1995 to salvage the bell from Edmund Fitzgerald.^[92] The Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians backed the expedition by co-signing a loan in the amount of $250,000.^[93] Canadian engineer Phil Nuytten‘s atmospheric diving suit, known as the Newtsuit, was used to retrieve the bell from the ship, replace it with a replica, and put a beer can in Edmund Fitzgerald‘s pilothouse.^[94] That same year, Terrence Tysall and Mike Zee set multiple records when they used trimix gas to scuba dive to Edmund Fitzgerald. The pair are the only people known to have touched the Edmund Fitzgerald wreck. They also set records for the deepest scuba dive on the Great Lakes and the deepest shipwreck dive, and were the first divers to reach Edmund Fitzgerald without the aid of a submersible. It took six minutes to reach the wreck, six minutes to survey it, and three hours to resurface to avoid decompression sickness, also known as “the bends”.^[95]

Restrictions on surveys

Under the Ontario Heritage Act, activities on registered archeological sites require a license.^[96] In March 2005, the Whitefish Point Preservation Society accused the Great Lakes Shipwreck Historical Society (GLSHS) of conducting an unauthorized dive to Edmund Fitzgerald. Although the director of the GLSHS admitted to conducting a sonar scan of the wreck in 2002, he denied such a survey required a license at the time it was carried out.^[97]

An April 2005 amendment to the Ontario Heritage Act allows the Ontario government to impose a license requirement on dives, the operation of submersibles, side scan sonars, or underwater cameras within a designated radius around protected sites.^[98][99] Conducting any of those activities without a license would result in fines of up to CA$1 million.^[100] On the basis of the amended law, to protect wreck sites considered “watery graves”, the Ontario government issued updated regulations in January 2006, including an area with a 500-meter (1,640 ft) radius around Edmund Fitzgerald and other specifically designated marine archeological sites.^[101][102] In 2009, a further amendment to the Ontario Heritage Act imposed licensing requirements on any type of surveying device.^[103]

Hypotheses on the cause of sinking

Extreme weather and sea conditions play a role in all of the published hypotheses regarding Edmund Fitzgerald‘s sinking, but they differ on the other causal factors.^[104]

Waves and weather hypothesis

In 2005, NOAA and the NWS ran a computer simulation, including weather and wave conditions, covering the period from November 9, 1975, until the early morning of November 11.^[105] Analysis of the simulation showed that two separate areas of high-speed wind appeared over Lake Superior at 4:00 p.m. on November 10. One had speeds in excess of 43 knots (80 km/h; 49 mph) and the other winds in excess of 40 knots (74 km/h; 46 mph).^[106] The southeastern part of the lake, the direction in which Edmund Fitzgerald was heading, had the highest winds. Average wave heights increased to near 19 feet (5.8 m) by 7:00 p.m., November 10, and winds exceeded 50 mph (43 kn; 80 km/h) over most of southeastern Lake Superior.^[107]

Edmund Fitzgerald sank at the eastern edge of the area of high wind^[108] where the long fetch, or distance that wind blows over water, produced significant waves averaging over 23 feet (7.0 m) by 7:00 p.m. and over 25 feet (7.6 m) at 8:00 p.m. The simulation also showed one in 100 waves reaching 36 feet