Update on Russia Advancing with Mearsheimer

stock here: noted in the comment, some pretend that Mearsheimer is suggesting that Russia may use nukes….he did not make that insinuation at all. When I first saw that I thought Mearsheimer was losing touch….that is not the case. Here is a summary

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The host frames the moment as “90% toward a peace deal” but questions whether there’s any real progress on the harder piece: security guarantees.

Lavrov’s “90% of what?” reaction is used as a tell: Russia is signaling it doesn’t recognize the West’s “nearly done” narrative and is still anchored to its June 2024 position.

Mearsheimer calls the “90%” talk Kabuki theater: PR meant to create hope and sustain support, not evidence of converging negotiating positions.

He argues the West mislabels the “last issue” as territory, when Russia’s core issue is NATO / NATO-like guarantees (Article 5 by another name).

On territory, he says Russia’s stated demand is not just Donbas—it includes Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, with Ukraine required to fully withdraw from those oblasts Russia claims/annexed.

A prior “only one issue left” claim (from a U.S. envoy/figure in the discussion) is treated as misleading, because Russia’s package is usually described as multiple linked conditions (neutrality/no NATO; force limits; “denazification” rhetoric; territorial outcomes).

Zelensky’s public line—no concessions, not even Donbas—is presented as further evidence that any “we’re almost there” story is detached from reality.

On “U.S. security guarantees are 100% agreed”: Mearsheimer says Washington’s silence matters, and U.S. strategy documents point toward shifting burdens to Europe and pivoting attention to East Asia, not formal Ukraine guarantees.

He distinguishes Russia’s 2022 “Istanbul” notion of guarantees as “common” guarantees (Russia included, with a veto on troop deployments) versus Zelensky’s desired bilateral U.S.–Ukraine guarantee (Russia excluded). Russia rejects the latter.

He says diplomacy is mostly a PR war running alongside battlefield operations; a real settlement, if it comes, is more likely an armistice / frozen conflict driven by battlefield facts (he cites Korea 1953 as an analogy), not a comprehensive peace deal now. Russia also rejects a ceasefire-first approach.

On why today differs from Istanbul 2022: he argues Ukraine would have gotten a better deal earlier; Russia is now more entrenched (four annexations claimed) and relations with Europe are more poisonous, pushing expectations toward a long “frozen conflict.”

He interprets Russia’s ongoing campaign (especially energy infrastructure strikes) as consistent with preparing for prolonged conflict and increasing coercive pressure—possibly driven by war duration/costs and internal pressure on Putin to “get tougher.”

Nukes—where he says the escalatory danger sits: he points to mainstream Russian strategist Sergey Karaganov arguing Russia should consider using nuclear weapons to end the war, and says that if 2026 resembles 2025 (attrition grind), pressure on Putin to escalate beyond conventional strikes could grow.

Nukes—his “attrition” logic that links to escalation: he frames the war primarily as attrition, not territorial speed; if Russia can’t “finish” Ukraine with conventional means soon, the incentive to seek a decisive break increases. He explicitly doesn’t claim nukes will happen, but flags the fact that serious elites are advocating them as a warning sign of how the conflict could become much more dangerous if the stalemate persists.