stock here: they stated that all 67 bodies were recovered. With 2 powerful missiles exploding into a plane that the Helo was going to follow the missiles into at 140 MPH, the entire front of the Helo was shredded. I would say those 3 humans were shredded too. And below some commentary from a guy who flies.
@mzrcnn
8 days ago (edited)Please let me add some details. Once upon a time, visual separation used to be my job. Change of runway from 01 to 33 is no problem at all but daily practice several times, every day. And here in this particular case, the deal between tower and cockpit was made about 5 minutes from disaster. American Eagle pilots actually like it, because it adds a few seconds of flight time, but saves them quite a lot of taxi time on the ground. Their gates, also for this CRJ7, are just at the end of RWY 33. The Tower is asking these pilots for one single reason: It widens the gap between two arriving planes, and allows Tower to squeeze a departing plane between these two arrivals. And no one likes to sit on a plane which is standing but not departing. The helicopter ROUTE 4 there over the east bank of the river is just perfect. However, rules must be obeyed, and that was omitted by BOTH the helicopter pilot but mostly by the controllers. Visual separation like between the regional jet and the Army helicopter is usually safe … but only if safely done. And here we have the problem. Please keep in mind … The PRIORITY for every air traffic controller is to PREVENT COLLISIONS. Period. That’s what he’s paid for. Everything else comes thereafter. Even if the controller delegates the “visual separation” to the pilot, this does not relieve the controller from preventing collisions. In addition, there have been two controllers, a Local Controller, and a Controller Associate, just like in the cockpit of the airliner. BOTH have the duty to prevent collisions. Both didn’t do anything. The controller is required to apply his BEST judgement of the situation. He didn’t. The associate didn’t warn him either. The very best judgement in that fateful night would have been if the controller himself had applied visual separation. NOT delegating this to the pilot. Why? Because the night is dark and the sky is black. The pilot doesn’t see the aircraft, but lights. Flashing red and white lights, plus landing lights. And in a city, there are plenty of other red and white lights. And in addition, the helicopter itself is moving, at low altitude. The very moment when the controller issued an alleged traffic advisory, the helicopter was proceeding at 200 feet southeast bound and he was geographically over the Tidal Basin. The controller told them “Traffic is south of the Wilson Bridge, a CRJ at 1200 feet, setting up for runway 33”. Looking to the right to the south, the helicopter saw the lights of not less than FOUR American Airlines jets on approach over the Potomac River. Two of the four were identical CRJ, three of the four were south of the bridge. But the helicopter pilot said « PAT25 has the traffic in sight, request visual separation » Tower said « approved ». OMG. With all due respect, that is good for nothing. A severe safety flaw. We don’t know what the pilot actually has seen, neither knew Tower, and the pilots can’t tell us anymore. The ill fated CRJ was 7.5 statute miles away from the helicopter. An air traffic controller must never anticipate neither believe nor hope, but he has the duty to be in control of the situation and to prevent collisions. VFR Night is different from VFR. Conditions at night are demanding. The Local Controller did not make sure that the helicopter indeed had the relevant traffic in sight, but he anticipated. I personally would have waited with the traffic advisory, at least until the CRJ was breaking off to the right. Worse … The controller omitted one other important thing: It was his duty to also pass a traffic advisory to the CRJ pilots because the two aircraft were on converging courses. Following this, the helicopter has flown some potentially distracting maneuvers, was a training flight, and the collisions tells us that he had obviously lost sight of the traffic and the helicopter was also climbing from 200 to 300 feet, higher than allowed. But the worst thing … There were two controllers sitting and visually observing the traffic. About 30 seconds from disaster, a so-called Conflict Alert went off in the Tower. That doesn’t solve the problem, but it warns the controllers that there IS a conflict which the Local Controller MUST resolve. The controller knew that he had a problem. We hear it in his voice in a radio transmission to a very different MedEvac helicopter. But all he did was asking “You have the CRJ in sight? Pass behind the CRJ” And then he was praying to God “Stay Separate”, we can hear it. Did the controller know what exactly the helicopter pilot had in sight? No! Did the controller know that the helicopter is able to pass behind … which aircraft actually? No. This is NOT air traffic control, to put it mildly. Yes of course, the helicopter pilot acted irresponsibly. The helicopter didn’t proceed as safely as it was required. There’s no doubt about it. But this is class Bravo airspace. Class Bravo has been invented to protect IFR traffic, here commercial airliners, from VFR traffic like this helicopter. And the controller is paid to prevent collisions. But he didn’t. The easiest method to prevent the collision was to instruct the helicopter to hold at HAINS POINT which is the southern tip of the East Potomac Park island, about 1 mile from the intersection of their flight paths, and to allow the CRJ a safe final approach. When the Conflict Alert came up, the helicopter just was at HAINS POINT. Voilà. The helicopter might have lost 30 seconds, or less. Now they’ve lost their lives. The controller has had the possibility to prevent this from happening. He didn’t. The CRJ pilots did everything right and had no chance to prevent this. The 33 approach means circling to the left, slightly banking to the left, reduced vision to the right, THEIR relevant traffic was a departing B738 on RWY 01, and they had never been informed about the helicopter. I’m just afraid that the authorities will protect the reputation of the FAA and their employees like the controllers, and blame it on the pilots who can’t defend themselves.