http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html
Taken
together, the documents provide a window into a culture of oversight at
the lab that, in the race to clean up the waste, had so broken down
that small missteps sometimes led to systemic problems.
Even before the waste was treated at Los Alamos,
mistakes had been made that could have been instrumental in causing the
accident at WIPP. Emails between WIPP contractors involved in the leak
investigation indicate that something as simple as a typographical error
in a revision of LANL’s procedural manual for processing waste
containing nitrate salts may have precipitated a switch from inorganic
clay kitty litter to the organic variety.
And for two years preceding the February incident,
the lab refused to allow inspectors conducting annual permitting audits
for the New Mexico Environment Department inside the facility where
waste was treated. Only since the radiation leak has the Environment
Department demanded that it go inside the facility for inspections.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.U7QN1Dse.dpuf
Taken
together, the documents provide a window into a culture of oversight at
the lab that, in the race to clean up the waste, had so broken down
that small missteps sometimes led to systemic problems.
Even before the waste was treated at Los Alamos,
mistakes had been made that could have been instrumental in causing the
accident at WIPP. Emails between WIPP contractors involved in the leak
investigation indicate that something as simple as a typographical error
in a revision of LANL’s procedural manual for processing waste
containing nitrate salts may have precipitated a switch from inorganic
clay kitty litter to the organic variety.
And for two years preceding the February incident,
the lab refused to allow inspectors conducting annual permitting audits
for the New Mexico Environment Department inside the facility where
waste was treated. Only since the radiation leak has the Environment
Department demanded that it go inside the facility for inspections.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.U7QN1Dse.dpuf
“This
is direct contradiction of DOE/NNSA policy and what we believed in,”
Chiou wrote to Franco, Bryson and others. “It is most important that we
have the information (regardless official or unofficial) so that we as
[the Carlsbad Field Office of the Energy Department] can make better
informed decisions as best we could. However, it may not work that way
as it seems. … I hope that we can do better in getting relevant
information from LANL so we can make a better decision for the WIPP
project.”
After a conference call with LANL officials, WIPP
decision-makers on May 30 sent workers in protective suits into the room
to collect samples. But a June 17 report by LANL personnel based at
WIPP found the intense underground flare may have destabilized up to 55
more drums of waste that were in close proximity to Waste Drum 68660
when it ruptured, calling into question whether they, too, had become
poised to burst.
“[The high heat event] may have dried out some of
the unreacted oxidizer-organic mixtures increasing their potential for
spontaneous reaction,” the report said. “The dehydration of the
fuel-oxidizer mixtures caused by the heating of the drums is recognized
as a condition known to increase the potential for reaction.”
Keeping secrets
Frustrations over LANL’s reluctance to share what
it knew about Waste Drum 68660 had been percolating at WIPP long before
the discovery of the memo that suggested the drum contained all the
ingredients of a patented plastic explosive.
A May 5 email between WIPP employee James Willison
and federal contractor Fran Williams suggested LANL was reluctant to
acknowledge the most basic details about what Waste Drum 68660 held.
“LANL used a wheat-based kitty litter rather than
clay-based kitty litter as a stabilizer,” Willison wrote. “They fessed
up after we nailed down the general area. … At least now we know.”
“Wow,” Williams responded. “How bad is that?”
On paper, the volatile combination of contents
inside the drum that burst were not evident to experts who reviewed them
because they were not included in the list of ingredients Los Alamos is
required to generate for regulatory purposes and to assure the waste is
stable enough to be accepted at WIPP.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.OyAxVRJE.dpuf
“This
is direct contradiction of DOE/NNSA policy and what we believed in,”
Chiou wrote to Franco, Bryson and others. “It is most important that we
have the information (regardless official or unofficial) so that we as
[the Carlsbad Field Office of the Energy Department] can make better
informed decisions as best we could. However, it may not work that way
as it seems. … I hope that we can do better in getting relevant
information from LANL so we can make a better decision for the WIPP
project.”
After a conference call with LANL officials, WIPP
decision-makers on May 30 sent workers in protective suits into the room
to collect samples. But a June 17 report by LANL personnel based at
WIPP found the intense underground flare may have destabilized up to 55
more drums of waste that were in close proximity to Waste Drum 68660
when it ruptured, calling into question whether they, too, had become
poised to burst.
“[The high heat event] may have dried out some of
the unreacted oxidizer-organic mixtures increasing their potential for
spontaneous reaction,” the report said. “The dehydration of the
fuel-oxidizer mixtures caused by the heating of the drums is recognized
as a condition known to increase the potential for reaction.”
Keeping secrets
Frustrations over LANL’s reluctance to share what
it knew about Waste Drum 68660 had been percolating at WIPP long before
the discovery of the memo that suggested the drum contained all the
ingredients of a patented plastic explosive.
A May 5 email between WIPP employee James Willison
and federal contractor Fran Williams suggested LANL was reluctant to
acknowledge the most basic details about what Waste Drum 68660 held.
“LANL used a wheat-based kitty litter rather than
clay-based kitty litter as a stabilizer,” Willison wrote. “They fessed
up after we nailed down the general area. … At least now we know.”
“Wow,” Williams responded. “How bad is that?”
On paper, the volatile combination of contents
inside the drum that burst were not evident to experts who reviewed them
because they were not included in the list of ingredients Los Alamos is
required to generate for regulatory purposes and to assure the waste is
stable enough to be accepted at WIPP.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.OyAxVRJE.dpuf
“This
is direct contradiction of DOE/NNSA policy and what we believed in,”
Chiou wrote to Franco, Bryson and others. “It is most important that we
have the information (regardless official or unofficial) so that we as
[the Carlsbad Field Office of the Energy Department] can make better
informed decisions as best we could. However, it may not work that way
as it seems. … I hope that we can do better in getting relevant
information from LANL so we can make a better decision for the WIPP
project.”
After a conference call with LANL officials, WIPP
decision-makers on May 30 sent workers in protective suits into the room
to collect samples. But a June 17 report by LANL personnel based at
WIPP found the intense underground flare may have destabilized up to 55
more drums of waste that were in close proximity to Waste Drum 68660
when it ruptured, calling into question whether they, too, had become
poised to burst.
“[The high heat event] may have dried out some of
the unreacted oxidizer-organic mixtures increasing their potential for
spontaneous reaction,” the report said. “The dehydration of the
fuel-oxidizer mixtures caused by the heating of the drums is recognized
as a condition known to increase the potential for reaction.”
Keeping secrets
Frustrations over LANL’s reluctance to share what
it knew about Waste Drum 68660 had been percolating at WIPP long before
the discovery of the memo that suggested the drum contained all the
ingredients of a patented plastic explosive.
A May 5 email between WIPP employee James Willison
and federal contractor Fran Williams suggested LANL was reluctant to
acknowledge the most basic details about what Waste Drum 68660 held.
“LANL used a wheat-based kitty litter rather than
clay-based kitty litter as a stabilizer,” Willison wrote. “They fessed
up after we nailed down the general area. … At least now we know.”
“Wow,” Williams responded. “How bad is that?”
On paper, the volatile combination of contents
inside the drum that burst were not evident to experts who reviewed them
because they were not included in the list of ingredients Los Alamos is
required to generate for regulatory purposes and to assure the waste is
stable enough to be accepted at WIPP.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.OyAxVRJE.dpuf
“This
is direct contradiction of DOE/NNSA policy and what we believed in,”
Chiou wrote to Franco, Bryson and others. “It is most important that we
have the information (regardless official or unofficial) so that we as
[the Carlsbad Field Office of the Energy Department] can make better
informed decisions as best we could. However, it may not work that way
as it seems. … I hope that we can do better in getting relevant
information from LANL so we can make a better decision for the WIPP
project.”
After a conference call with LANL officials, WIPP
decision-makers on May 30 sent workers in protective suits into the room
to collect samples. But a June 17 report by LANL personnel based at
WIPP found the intense underground flare may have destabilized up to 55
more drums of waste that were in close proximity to Waste Drum 68660
when it ruptured, calling into question whether they, too, had become
poised to burst.
“[The high heat event] may have dried out some of
the unreacted oxidizer-organic mixtures increasing their potential for
spontaneous reaction,” the report said. “The dehydration of the
fuel-oxidizer mixtures caused by the heating of the drums is recognized
as a condition known to increase the potential for reaction.”
Keeping secrets
Frustrations over LANL’s reluctance to share what
it knew about Waste Drum 68660 had been percolating at WIPP long before
the discovery of the memo that suggested the drum contained all the
ingredients of a patented plastic explosive.
A May 5 email between WIPP employee James Willison
and federal contractor Fran Williams suggested LANL was reluctant to
acknowledge the most basic details about what Waste Drum 68660 held.
“LANL used a wheat-based kitty litter rather than
clay-based kitty litter as a stabilizer,” Willison wrote. “They fessed
up after we nailed down the general area. … At least now we know.”
“Wow,” Williams responded. “How bad is that?”
On paper, the volatile combination of contents
inside the drum that burst were not evident to experts who reviewed them
because they were not included in the list of ingredients Los Alamos is
required to generate for regulatory purposes and to assure the waste is
stable enough to be accepted at WIPP.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.OyAxVRJE.dpuf
“This
is direct contradiction of DOE/NNSA policy and what we believed in,”
Chiou wrote to Franco, Bryson and others. “It is most important that we
have the information (regardless official or unofficial) so that we as
[the Carlsbad Field Office of the Energy Department] can make better
informed decisions as best we could. However, it may not work that way
as it seems. … I hope that we can do better in getting relevant
information from LANL so we can make a better decision for the WIPP
project.”
After a conference call with LANL officials, WIPP
decision-makers on May 30 sent workers in protective suits into the room
to collect samples. But a June 17 report by LANL personnel based at
WIPP found the intense underground flare may have destabilized up to 55
more drums of waste that were in close proximity to Waste Drum 68660
when it ruptured, calling into question whether they, too, had become
poised to burst.
“[The high heat event] may have dried out some of
the unreacted oxidizer-organic mixtures increasing their potential for
spontaneous reaction,” the report said. “The dehydration of the
fuel-oxidizer mixtures caused by the heating of the drums is recognized
as a condition known to increase the potential for reaction.”
Keeping secrets
Frustrations over LANL’s reluctance to share what
it knew about Waste Drum 68660 had been percolating at WIPP long before
the discovery of the memo that suggested the drum contained all the
ingredients of a patented plastic explosive.
A May 5 email between WIPP employee James Willison
and federal contractor Fran Williams suggested LANL was reluctant to
acknowledge the most basic details about what Waste Drum 68660 held.
“LANL used a wheat-based kitty litter rather than
clay-based kitty litter as a stabilizer,” Willison wrote. “They fessed
up after we nailed down the general area. … At least now we know.”
“Wow,” Williams responded. “How bad is that?”
On paper, the volatile combination of contents
inside the drum that burst were not evident to experts who reviewed them
because they were not included in the list of ingredients Los Alamos is
required to generate for regulatory purposes and to assure the waste is
stable enough to be accepted at WIPP.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.OyAxVRJE.dpuf
“This
is direct contradiction of DOE/NNSA policy and what we believed in,”
Chiou wrote to Franco, Bryson and others. “It is most important that we
have the information (regardless official or unofficial) so that we as
[the Carlsbad Field Office of the Energy Department] can make better
informed decisions as best we could. However, it may not work that way
as it seems. … I hope that we can do better in getting relevant
information from LANL so we can make a better decision for the WIPP
project.”
After a conference call with LANL officials, WIPP
decision-makers on May 30 sent workers in protective suits into the room
to collect samples. But a June 17 report by LANL personnel based at
WIPP found the intense underground flare may have destabilized up to 55
more drums of waste that were in close proximity to Waste Drum 68660
when it ruptured, calling into question whether they, too, had become
poised to burst.
“[The high heat event] may have dried out some of
the unreacted oxidizer-organic mixtures increasing their potential for
spontaneous reaction,” the report said. “The dehydration of the
fuel-oxidizer mixtures caused by the heating of the drums is recognized
as a condition known to increase the potential for reaction.”
Keeping secrets
Frustrations over LANL’s reluctance to share what
it knew about Waste Drum 68660 had been percolating at WIPP long before
the discovery of the memo that suggested the drum contained all the
ingredients of a patented plastic explosive.
A May 5 email between WIPP employee James Willison
and federal contractor Fran Williams suggested LANL was reluctant to
acknowledge the most basic details about what Waste Drum 68660 held.
“LANL used a wheat-based kitty litter rather than
clay-based kitty litter as a stabilizer,” Willison wrote. “They fessed
up after we nailed down the general area. … At least now we know.”
“Wow,” Williams responded. “How bad is that?”
On paper, the volatile combination of contents
inside the drum that burst were not evident to experts who reviewed them
because they were not included in the list of ingredients Los Alamos is
required to generate for regulatory purposes and to assure the waste is
stable enough to be accepted at WIPP.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.OyAxVRJE.dpuf
“This
is direct contradiction of DOE/NNSA policy and what we believed in,”
Chiou wrote to Franco, Bryson and others. “It is most important that we
have the information (regardless official or unofficial) so that we as
[the Carlsbad Field Office of the Energy Department] can make better
informed decisions as best we could. However, it may not work that way
as it seems. … I hope that we can do better in getting relevant
information from LANL so we can make a better decision for the WIPP
project.”
After a conference call with LANL officials, WIPP
decision-makers on May 30 sent workers in protective suits into the room
to collect samples. But a June 17 report by LANL personnel based at
WIPP found the intense underground flare may have destabilized up to 55
more drums of waste that were in close proximity to Waste Drum 68660
when it ruptured, calling into question whether they, too, had become
poised to burst.
“[The high heat event] may have dried out some of
the unreacted oxidizer-organic mixtures increasing their potential for
spontaneous reaction,” the report said. “The dehydration of the
fuel-oxidizer mixtures caused by the heating of the drums is recognized
as a condition known to increase the potential for reaction.”
Keeping secrets
Frustrations over LANL’s reluctance to share what
it knew about Waste Drum 68660 had been percolating at WIPP long before
the discovery of the memo that suggested the drum contained all the
ingredients of a patented plastic explosive.
A May 5 email between WIPP employee James Willison
and federal contractor Fran Williams suggested LANL was reluctant to
acknowledge the most basic details about what Waste Drum 68660 held.
“LANL used a wheat-based kitty litter rather than
clay-based kitty litter as a stabilizer,” Willison wrote. “They fessed
up after we nailed down the general area. … At least now we know.”
“Wow,” Williams responded. “How bad is that?”
On paper, the volatile combination of contents
inside the drum that burst were not evident to experts who reviewed them
because they were not included in the list of ingredients Los Alamos is
required to generate for regulatory purposes and to assure the waste is
stable enough to be accepted at WIPP.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.OyAxVRJE.dpuf
“This
is direct contradiction of DOE/NNSA policy and what we believed in,”
Chiou wrote to Franco, Bryson and others. “It is most important that we
have the information (regardless official or unofficial) so that we as
[the Carlsbad Field Office of the Energy Department] can make better
informed decisions as best we could. However, it may not work that way
as it seems. … I hope that we can do better in getting relevant
information from LANL so we can make a better decision for the WIPP
project.”
After a conference call with LANL officials, WIPP
decision-makers on May 30 sent workers in protective suits into the room
to collect samples. But a June 17 report by LANL personnel based at
WIPP found the intense underground flare may have destabilized up to 55
more drums of waste that were in close proximity to Waste Drum 68660
when it ruptured, calling into question whether they, too, had become
poised to burst.
“[The high heat event] may have dried out some of
the unreacted oxidizer-organic mixtures increasing their potential for
spontaneous reaction,” the report said. “The dehydration of the
fuel-oxidizer mixtures caused by the heating of the drums is recognized
as a condition known to increase the potential for reaction.”
Keeping secrets
Frustrations over LANL’s reluctance to share what
it knew about Waste Drum 68660 had been percolating at WIPP long before
the discovery of the memo that suggested the drum contained all the
ingredients of a patented plastic explosive.
A May 5 email between WIPP employee James Willison
and federal contractor Fran Williams suggested LANL was reluctant to
acknowledge the most basic details about what Waste Drum 68660 held.
“LANL used a wheat-based kitty litter rather than
clay-based kitty litter as a stabilizer,” Willison wrote. “They fessed
up after we nailed down the general area. … At least now we know.”
“Wow,” Williams responded. “How bad is that?”
On paper, the volatile combination of contents
inside the drum that burst were not evident to experts who reviewed them
because they were not included in the list of ingredients Los Alamos is
required to generate for regulatory purposes and to assure the waste is
stable enough to be accepted at WIPP.
- See more at: http://www.lasg.org/press/2014/SFNM_16Nov2014.html#sthash.OyAxVRJE.dpuf
The total lack of accountability is infuriating!
ReplyDeleteWell today the feds bitch slapped LANL, instead of letting them make $65M profit, they reduced it to $6M
ReplyDeleteShareholders take note, it is no longer safe to own radiation related stocks.